Just finished listening to Wolfe at Quebec by Christopher Hibbert. I pulled it from the shelves at the library because, during my recent business trip to Quebec, I had the opportunity to take the tour of the citadel that the British built some years after Wolfe's victory to protect Quebec from the Americans.
The interesting thing is this: the story I was told there of the battle bears no resemblance to the story told in this book. The guide said that the French defenders expected an attach from east (north?) of the city and, when the British landed west (south?) and set up on the plains of Abraham, the French had to run for two hours and arrived exhausted to face a rested British force that had had time to "put two bullets in their muskets."
From the book, I learned that the French forces guarding Quebec far out-numbered the British and held a naturally defensible position that had been reinforced up and down the river at every key landing place. They were totally confident of preventing any major landing. Although neither side was exemplary in military management, only incompetence and corruption possible extending to outright treachery allowed the British to land. Then, incompetence and lack of trust caused the French to engage with less than their full force, but with a number approximately equalling the opposing British.
The British, after several days of being packed into boats and floating or being towed up and down the St. Lawrence, had landed the evening before to little or no resistance, then spent the night getting themselves, cannon and supplies up the cliffs. Then they spent the morning standing in the rain. Rested? Hardly.